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Abstract 
Background 
Global health policy and development aid trends also affect humanitarian health work. 
Reconstruction, rehabilitation and development initiatives start increasingly earlier after 
crisis, unleashing tensions between development and humanitarian paradigms. Recently, 
development aid shows specific interest in contexts affected by conflict and fragility, with 
increasing expectations for health interventions to demonstrate transformative potential, 
including towards more resilient health systems as a contribution to state-building agendas. 
Discussion 
Current drives towards state-building opportunities in health interventions is mainly based on 
political aspirations, with little conclusive evidence on linking state-building efforts to 
conflict prevention, neither on transformative effects of health systems support. Moreover, 
negative consequences are possible in such volatile environments. We explore how to 
anticipate, discuss and monitor potential negative effects of current state-building approaches 
on health interventions, including on humanitarian aid. 
Overriding health systems approaches might increase tension in fragile and conflict affected 
contexts, because at odds with goals typically associated with immediate emergency response 
to populations’ needs. Especially in protracted crisis, quality and timeliness of humanitarian 
response can be compromised, with strain on impartiality, targeting the most vulnerable, 
prioritising direct health benefits and most effective strategies. 
State-building focus could shift health aid priorities away from sick people and disease. 
Precedence of state institutions support over immediate, effective health service delivery can 
reduce population level results. 
As consequence people might question health workers’ intention to privilege health above 
political, ethnic or other alliances, altering health and humanitarian workers’ perception. 
Particularly in conflict, neither health system nor state are impartial bystanders. 
Summary 
In spite of scarce evidence on benefits of health systems support for state-building, current 
dominant line of thought among donors might influence aid strategies and modalities in 
settings of crisis, conflict and longer-term health system fragility. Negative consequences 
may arise from dominance of political agendas over health needs, with risk for effectiveness, 
nature and perception of health interventions. Potential effects in at least three key health 
areas merit critical review: quality of humanitarian health interventions, tangible 
contributions to population level health benefits, perception of health and humanitarian 
workers. To keep health needs as yardstick to determine effective health and humanitarian 
priority investments, is challenging. 
Keywords 
Health systems, Fragile contexts, Conflict, Humanitarian aid, Access to care, State building, 
Post 2015 agenda 
Background 
Global health policy trends in development might affect also humanitarian health work, both 
due to their influence on the overall health arena humanitarians work in and the potential 
blurring of the lines in the perception of health actors with different missions. Humanitarian 
health interventions primarily respond to human suffering and need to impact rapidly and 
directly by mitigating excess mortality and morbidity. In medical humanitarianism, the 
medical act itself and its immediate impact on mortality are of value, not its contribution to 
other wider goals, however lofty. Beyond the medical-humanitarian sphere, other health 
actors may aspire to contribute to health systems development or wider effects outside the 
health sector, such as state legitimacy or peace building. This translates into stark differences 
in operational and programmatic approaches [1,2]. 
The tension between, and the challenge of linking up, emergency humanitarian and 
development aid approaches are a long-standing and unresolved debate among analysts and 
practitioners [3,4]. This article aims to unpack the potential effects of the most recent chapter 
in the ongoing debate —the aspiration to use health systems support in the service of state-
building. We examine the implications of this new approach in conflict or crisis settings, as 
well as its implementation in post-conflict, fragile or development settings, to explore what 
limitations arise in health systems support as a transformative instrument beyond the health 
sector and what stakes for humanitarian and health aid emerge. 
At the beginning of the millennium, global health focused on population-based results in 
reductions of ill health and mortality, as a basis of and precondition for human and economic 
development; it was at this point in time that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
took form, both at global and at country level. Current trends in the health policy and aid 
debate have shifted from attacking major killer diseases, towards favoring support to existing 
health systems. The paradigm of health systems is now incorporated in the policy of most 
health donors, including global health initiatives created to target specific diseases or health 
interventions, such as the Global Fund for AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), 
PEPFAR and GAVI. Consequently, this paradigm shift has influenced the profile and 
approach of most implementing actors in health. 
Recently, development aid has showed specific interest in conflict and fragility, not merely as 
complicating factors, but as subjects of development interventions per se. Increasingly health 
interventions now are expected to demonstrate transformative potential, including prominent 
objectives of peace and state building. Regularly, health interventions limited to humanitarian 
relief are criticized as a missed opportunity or even as a potential threat for systems 
development and state building [5,6]. Increasingly, concerns about effectiveness and 
impartiality of humanitarian health interventions seem to lose ground in favor of the political 
and development narrative of health for state building. 
The current focus of development aid on countries that combine lowest income and least 
progress towards the MDGs, has brought additional donor attention to crisis- affected and 
fragile states. The World Bank report has identified violence and conflict as obstacles for 
development progress and proposes the building of credible state institutions as a mitigating 
intervention [7]. This type of state building as prevention for repeated cycles of violence –in 
particular in fragile contexts- is seen as a possibly less expensive alternative to interventions 
during conflict, such as the deployment of peace keeping forces etc. [8-11]. These preventive, 
cost-limiting aspects have rekindled interest in the potential of health care as a transformative 
action. A striking parallel can be seen in the emergence of the concept of resilience in crisis 
affected populations, its interest possibly reinforced by the economic crisis in donor countries 
[12-14]. 
Health interventions used by states and non-state actors to achieve foreign policy objectives 
is a controversial yet growing part of health diplomacy [15]. Specifically, in post-conflict 
contexts and situations of protracted crisis, both humanitarian and development actors appear 
simultaneously, along with agencies with mixed mandates. During the last decade, 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and development initiatives have started increasingly earlier in 
the post-crisis phase, increasing tensions between different paradigms. 
Following Busan and the Dili declarations [16], the aid effectiveness agenda has developed a 
specific interest in fragile states. A group of fragile and conflict affected countries, 
development partners and international organisations announced the ‘New Deal’ for 
engagement in fragile states. This group has taken on ‘Peace and State building Goals’ as the 
basis for progress towards the MDGs in fragile contexts, with a focus on country-led and 
owned transition processes out of fragility [17]. 
Within the global consultation on the post 2015 development agenda, discussions went well 
beyond health, into the specific topic of conflict and fragility. The G7+ has requested that 
peace and state building goals be integrated into the Sustainable Development Goals. Hence, 
the focus of health in fragile states might be increasingly expanded from a contribution to the 
MDGs to a tool of conflict prevention and state building per se. A recent proposal to create 
‘humanitarian goals’ and the debate it spurred shows its presence in the current policy debate 
[18,19]. 
Discussion 
High expectations of health as broader transformative instrument in a wide 
variety of contexts 
The current drive to emphasize state building opportunities in health and health systems 
interventions is mainly based on political aspirations and concepts. The jury is still out as 
regards the evidence for health systems support as a transformative instrument beyond the 
health sector. 
‘Health as a bridge for peace’ is not a new concept. Though it proved difficult to 
operationalize and apply in the past, it remains appealing and variations on the theme 
proliferate as peace dividend, violence mitigation or conflict transformation. Even if evidence 
is scarce on the expected benefits of health for state building [5,20,21], it currently remains 
the dominant line of thought among donors. For health actors dependent on donor 
preferences, it is hard to challenge the received wisdom of this policy trend. By and large, 
many organisations already adopt this donor paradigm, ahead of field based reality checks. 
A major difficulty in the current policy discussion is the tendency to lump together ‘fragile 
and conflict affected contexts’ (FCAS) as one group [22-25], implying that a similar 
operational and political approach could work across different countries in such a 
heterogeneous group. This practice contrasts with earlier recommended differentiation 
according to typology [26-28]. Even without commenting on the varying interpretations of 
‘fragility’ by different actors, conflict as ingredient of the mixture changes things 
fundamentally and renders the proposed ‘peace and state building’ approach rather explosive. 
The approach proposed in the New Deal treats the role of states in a highly abstract and 
apolitical manner, eliding states’ own implication as potential actors in violence or partisans 
within conflict. Recent developments in South Sudan and CAR, both in 2013 piloting ground 
for several state and peace building initiatives [29], highlight the governments’ implication in 
new outbreaks of violence with ethnic, religious or political character. 
The definition of fragility includes countries unable but also unwilling to provide essential 
services to their population [30,31], but in the current paradigm, the latter consideration 
seems to have been left out of the equation, as donors aim to support existing state 
institutions and government led plans, irrespective of the state’s benevolence towards its own 
population and its concrete commitment to results in health improvements for those most 
affected [32,33]. The idea of government accountability assumes the legitimacy of 
governments, while in absence of it, strengthening government systems might rather increase 
tensions among population groups, not to mention toward aid organizations implicated in 
such support [34]. Moreover, in contexts where (aid to) health care is an important source of 
resources, neglecting issues of political and vested interests linked to health systems can be 
conflictual per se and is likely to backfire. 
In post conflict and post crisis situations, the question as to when (and how) to move from 
emergency to development remains a source of intense political debate. In practice, this 
judgment depends on context but also on political factors. Hence, who decides if conflict is 
over and if state building should be on the agenda, determines a major part of the process and 
access to potential resources. Under the New Deal initiative, judging the sufficient recovery 
of countries after conflict is left mainly to an evaluation by government and development 
actors [35]. It is unclear if and how humanitarian actors will be included; most humanitarian 
actors are not involved in the recent assessments in DRC, South Sudan, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. 
Applying a ‘do no harm’ principle 
Besides the possible absence of the desired effects [36] one cannot exclude unintended 
negative consequences in such volatile environments. Several donor policy papers include 
‘do no harm’ guidance but these concentrate on potential undermining of the state building 
process [37,38]. We would argue there is also a place to anticipate, discuss and monitor 
potential negative effects of the current state building approach on health interventions and 
health results, including effects on humanitarian aid. Previous experience in contexts where 
development and humanitarian approaches co-exist, have revealed significant tensions, in 
particular around dominance of the political agenda over the humanitarian principles, with a 
risk of less effectiveness of humanitarian aid to those most in need. 
We suggest at least three areas of concern: compromises in quality and effectiveness of 
humanitarian response; reduced health benefits as result of supported health interventions; 
changes in perception of health workers and interventions. 
Compromised humanitarian response under a health 
systems for state building approach 
In the health systems approach according to the World Health organization [39] service 
delivery is only one of six building blocks, within a larger framework of wider, longer term 
objectives to strengthen systemic capacity. This can be at odds with goals more typically 
associated with immediate emergency response to populations’ needs, central to humanitarian 
action [1]. The adaptive capacity of health systems to increased or emerging health needs 
linked to crisis differs strongly from context to context, and may also advance and regress 
over time. In weak, deficient or inequitable health systems in particular, the timeframe 
needed for expected improvements is uncertain and in case of setbacks in the situation, e.g. 
renewed violence or increased direct health needs following outbreaks or influx of displaced 
people, it has regularly proven difficult to ‘change gears’. Health systems often fail to 
respond effectively to these renewed needs through accessible services with direct health 
impact, as described in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [40] or Ivory Coast and 
Liberia [41]. 
In these situations, a significant tension is created between health interventions responding 
rapidly and effectively to urgent health needs of the most vulnerable and those with longer 
term aspirations of improving existing health systems. This can amount to barely concealed 
hostility, such as illustrated by a passage in the DRC’s national strategy on health systems 
strengthening, a policy most development actors in DRC have adopted. It states that 
humanitarian interventions had an […essentially ad hoc] approach, which should have given 
[…way to action for development] and are described as [… entrenched, concealing their true 
nature: a tool disorganizing the health system in DRC] [42]. 
In violence and conflict affected contexts, humanitarian interventions may be also viewed as 
antagonists of system development and their benefit considered ‘out of place’ once the 
country is declared in a reconstruction and development phase. Especially because the 
distinction between conflict and post-conflict can be so imprecise, it is worth to note the 
highly political nature of determining when conflict or crisis ends. Many states show 
reluctance to accept the continued role of war, violence and socio-economic precariousness 
as part of the context reality, as illustrated in the country’s self-assessments under the New 
Deal. Often this recognition is feared to delay or make the transition to development less 
clear cut, or even could raise questions about the legitimacy of development-oriented 
arrangements that coincide with potential vested interests of the existing system and state 
institutions. 
A typical and recurring tension in crisis situations concerns patient fees. The potential 
negative consequences of making patients pay for essential health care are well known [43]. 
In emergency contexts in particular the importance of accessing essential care without direct 
payment is recognised, including by major donors [44]. However, some development actors 
consider provision of care free of charge as depriving health systems of income from patient 
fees. Even if user fees’ contribution to sustained services is questionable and currently widely 
questioned [45], a systems perspective often outweighs the expected benefits for patients in 
terms of access, quality of care, potential impact and mitigation of iatrogenic poverty. In 
many weak and underfunded health systems patient fees are still considered as an acceptable 
‘survival strategy’ of the system. MSF experience in DRC has shown reluctance by health 
facilities to declare outbreaks, because this would imply suspension of patient fees. Today, in 
DRC and Central African Republic (CAR), patients need to pay in order to obtain essential 
care, in spite of the widely recognised crisis. 
The tension between rapid effectiveness and systems development appeared also in Haiti 
after the 2010 earthquake, with a [… national health system … still struggling to respond to 
the huge needs it continues to face] [46]. In particular for health actors with mixed mandates, 
the tension created by the collision of humanitarian and development approaches is reflected 
in practical operational choices. Downscaling of the health intervention relatively fast after 
the acute emergency phase is often felt as necessary on basis of concerns over sustainability 
of the current health care response and limitations of national capacity. Often it is implied 
that the primary intention of the emergency intervention should have at least included some 
measurable system benefit. This can lead to compromises in effective and timely 
humanitarian intervention, in spite of recognised continued needs of the population and 
continued weakness of the national health system to respond to these needs. 
The paradox is that the weaker health systems are, the stronger the development impetus is to 
strengthen their capacity for the future, but also that re-establishing reliable health care 
delivery needed by the population within a reasonable timeframe through the existing 
weak(ened) system is quite a challenge. Still, in post crisis, investing in systems for better 
health outcomes in the long term proves often quite a gamble, as violence is often cyclical 
and even natural disasters show a clustering and repetitive tendency [7]. Hence, support of 
the state health system in so called ‘fragile states’ is less likely to translate into concrete 
health impact for the population, and in particular vulnerable groups might be/remain 
excluded due to pre-crisis inequity or shortfalls in the reconstructed system. 
Health systems support for state building potentially 
leading to less effective health response 
Where health systems support aims to contribute to conflict transformation or state building, 
a possible shift can be expected towards outcomes other than treating patients and healthy 
populations. Its focus as regards the main priority of a health system – curing sick people and 
preventing disease- might be lost [21]. This might bring additional challenges to finding a 
healthy balance between desired outcomes and to keeping people’s health benefits central. A 
group of NGOs in South Sudan cited this concern in a recent statement [47]: “… political and 
financial support to the Government of South Sudan has, until now, been generally quite 
high, but support to the humanitarian needs of the people has sometimes wavered. Whilst 
recognizing the importance of building national institutions, the recent crisis has highlighted 
that a focus on ‘state building’ can come at the expense of supporting sustainable peace and 
development that all South Sudanese can benefit from.” 
In practice, the current focus on health systems strengthening often sidelines delivery models 
complementing or parallel to the formal –often governmental- health care services. Arguably, 
in cases where state building is part of the wider objective, supporting and building credible 
health care institutions as part of the state could further take precedence over immediate and 
effective service delivery. Non-Governmental Organisations’ (NGO) interventions outside 
government coordination are seen as less desirable, not only for health systems but also for 
state legitimacy [5,34]. This is counterproductive, in particular in countries where large and 
effective medical networks linked to NGOs and faith based organisations provide a large 
proportion of health services, such as in Liberia, DRC, Haiti and elsewhere. If maximising 
impact through these non-governmental or faith-based networks seems a promising strategy, 
the state building agenda might nevertheless favor the use of the governmental health system 
at all costs. Recent examples from Islamic NGOs in the Middle East illustrate how different 
actors might find different ways to access people in need, depending on varying levels of 
cultural proximity or belonging in certain geographic areas [48]. In contrast, within the 
approach proposed by the New Deal, the preferential channeling of resources to country 
systems and towards national capacities is central: “International partners will increase the 
percentage of aid delivered through country systems on the basis of measures and targets 
jointly agreed at country level.” [49]. 
Changing perceptions of health interventions and actors 
Harnessing health systems support for state building efforts raises questions on the 
implications of such an approach for humanitarian access, against the background of the long 
debate on “blurring the lines” between humanitarian action and other objectives, and its 
potential impact on the population’s perception of humanitarians [50,51], and thus on the safe 
access of patients to care and humanitarian access to patients. Embedding objectives of state 
building in health care provision might reinforce perceptions of partiality, including of 
humanitarian health actors. 
The ever more prominent agendas of state-building and stabilization, as well as other 
“coherent” approaches to humanitarian aid, only further complicate the challenging endeavor 
of medical humanitarian work, putting humanitarian principles, operations and practitioners 
themselves at increased risk [4]. Documentation on politicization of humanitarian aid has 
advanced significantly in recent years. The next step will be to examine the field-level 
implications for humanitarian and other health interventions of the current approach proposed 
for fragile contexts with state-building and systemic capacity at its centre. Will over time any 
health intervention –including humanitarian ones - be perceived mainly as a tool for state 
reinforcement? 
The G7+ statement [52] points to the specific need for “[e]ffective programs that protect and 
strengthen the most vulnerable and reach the most remote and inaccessible areas…” in health 
and other sectors of human and social development. However, it asserts that “[a]id must be 
distributed fairly across the country to reduce risks of conflict, and ensure social inclusion 
and a common national identity that is respected by international partners.” This concept of 
aid as conflict risk prevention stands in contradiction with principles central to humanitarian 
aid such as impartial provision of aid, targeting and proportionality of assistance with needs. 
In cases where the health system itself is attacked, used as a battleground [53,54] or 
perceived as partisan in the conflict, additional barriers to equitable and effective delivery and 
access to care emerge. In conflict situations in particular, neither the health system nor the 
state is an impartial bystander. Health structures have been targeted in armed attacks, but also 
have been used as instruments to “win hearts and minds” by parties in combat or to buy votes 
[21,55,56]. From the perspective of state building and stabilization, it has been suggested to 
target health care to those who pose the greatest threat to peace, rather than those most in 
need, even if for a limited period of time [57]. 
Although initiatives such as the ‘New Deal’ and the Post 2015 development agenda are 
clearly part and parcel of development policy, there is no mention that humanitarian aid and 
emergency medical response constitute a distinct exception to the approaches proposed. 
Moreover, in practice, this distinction between development and humanitarian actors is likely 
to remain unclear in the perception of the general population and armed groups, with 
potentially negative consequences on access of medical humanitarian actors to populations 
and populations’ access to assistance [58]. 
With all that is at stake—compromises in quality and access to health care, aggravation of 
tensions over health (care) as a resource, the problem of unwilling governments—the burden 
of proof lies with this approach to show how it will achieve transformative objectives without 
compromising the lives and health of those in need of care in fragile settings. 
Summary 
The current trend in global health discussions and health aid in particular to focus on ‘fragile 
and conflict affected states’ could further increase tensions into a highly volatile working 
environment. In particular, state and peace building objectives might transform the strategic 
choices, the modalities and perception of health responses for people in precarious health and 
living conditions. 
In particular, the explicit focus on conflict and fragility within the aid effectiveness agenda 
and the post 2015 MDG discussions, might push health care for people affected by crisis and 
conflict to its limits. In these contexts, strategic choices geared towards health care support 
for patients and effective delivery models, might increasingly be influenced by the political 
framework of state ownership, state building and stabilization. Effective patient care and 
population based results might be sidelined or compromised by approaches that better fit 
potential transformative and systems aspects of health interventions. Ultimately, this 
approach could profoundly influence operational choices about type of interventions and 
approaches to targeting beneficiaries because of expected state building benefits, potentially 
reinforcing perceptions of health as partisan to or supporting parties in power. 
We identified specific risks of these recent state-building initiatives for medical-humanitarian 
action and effective health delivery in conflict affected and fragile contexts. Significant 
tensions might grow around results expected from and obtained by health interventions. In 
particular, impartial and proportional aid, setting health benefits as priority, choices of most 
effective health strategies and targeting of the most vulnerable people might come under 
strain by striving to reinforce state stability and legitimacy as the overriding objective. 
Ultimately, there is a risk of missing out on existing health needs because it may not be 
politically feasible to point to vulnerabilities, gaps or moments where there are setbacks in 
the health system, as state capacity becomes the locus where progress is measured. 
Further blurring of the different mandates and responsibilities might lead to decreased 
understanding and acceptance of humanitarian organisations, but also to questioning health 
workers’ genuine intention to privilege health services above political, ethnic or other 
alliances. In a global framework there might be a growing lack (or loss) of recognition that 
agencies with a humanitarian mandate do not necessarily support the wider state building 
agenda. This will further complicate risks for perception of aid personnel, the secure access 
of humanitarians to populations in need, and their access to assistance and medical care when 
needed. 
In analogy to the well-developed debate about the distinct nature of humanitarian space 
(including politicization of aid and the tension or linking of humanitarian and development 
interventions), today there is an urgent need for debate about the distinct space for medical 
interventions in crisis situations, in order to be able to obtain the full, optimal impact of 
health interventions in response to urgent medical needs. This discussion should include the 
expected health outcomes for populations in crisis and how to preserve these within a wider 
policy agenda currently shifting towards state building and resilient health systems. In 
particular, caution is in order where aid is confronted with conflict or violence, the 
unwillingness of governments and/or vested interests and competition for scarce resources. 
From a medical-humanitarian perspective, it is crucial to keep direct health and humanitarian 
results for the population at the centre of post crisis interventions and not compromise on this 
concrete and immediate objective, even if deemed less interesting for state building or other 
political aspirations. 
At present, the lack of concrete evidence on feasibility and benefits of health care for state 
building seems to hardly reduce the enthusiasm for it as a political project. When such 
evidence does emerge, this should not lead to a backlash towards less humanitarian aid or less 
aid for health. First and foremost, health and humanitarian investments must be gauged on the 
basis of how they can improve people’s lives and wellbeing-- and this approach, based on 
long-standing best practices, cannot be compromised without significant human impact. 
Given what is at stake in situations of crisis, conflict or fragility in particular, effective health 
and humanitarian interventions in response to people’s immediate needs can make all the 
difference and should not be undermined by today’s aspirations towards state building and 
the wider transformative project of health systems support. 
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